Title: Virginia (BY: Katharine S.)

Estopina v. O’Brian, 68 A.3d 790 (D.C. 2013) Facts Husband and wife married in 2005. In 2006 the child was born. In 2009 the couple separated. The district court awarded the wife custody of the child and allowed relocation to Virginia Beach, VA. The husband appealed because the court did not determine the best interest of the child when granting the custody. The lower court looked at the following facts. The wife was a stay at home mom with the child since the child’s birth. The husband had to travel for his work, but was still there for certain daily tasks like doctor’s appointments. After the separation the husband lost his job and the couple could not afford the home. The wife moved back to her family home in Arlington, Virginia, while the husband stayed in DC. In Virginia the wife took a job as a teacher. The wife expressed difficulty in taking the child to school in the DC area and trying to get to work in the Virginia. Also with the loss of income the couple could not afford to send the child to private school so the child had to go to another school. The child was able to be enrolled in a school in Virginia Beach that the wife’s sister owned. The child did have a close relation ship with the wife’s family and the husband did not have family in the DC area. The husband objected to the child being in Virginia. The husband wanted the child to be in a school that had a Spanish immersion program and the DC offered several schools where the child could attend. His argument was counter because the school in Virginia did have a Spanish class. Rule of Law The court defined joint physical custody involving some sort of shared custody and in this case meant that one parent is awarded custody and one parent visitation rights. Hutchins v. Compton, 917 A.2d 680 (D.C. 2007) In determining the best interest of the child the court looked to D.C. Code § 16-914(a)(3) (2001) and weighed all the facts against the factors necessary. To determine if the relocation was a factor the court relied on the previous case of Samuel v. Person 138 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 1537, 1543 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 15, 2010).

The Delaware Court Holds that Child Custody should be Granted to Mother when Father Refuses to Stop Showering with his Daughter (BY: Julie R.)

Case Summary: H.D.E. v. K.L.B., 2013 WL 7020499 Link for opinion: https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/I74b54bc381e111e39ac8bab74931929c/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv3%2Fsearch%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad705200000014455d992939a3b6cee%3FNav%3DCASE%26fragmentIdentifier%3DI74b54bc381e111e39ac8bab74931929c%26startIndex%3D1%26contextData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3DSearchItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=e80538baa093ed9ffd4bacce06cc4e2f&list=CASE&rank=7&grading=na&sessionScopeId=9d60b6a299f8e1e7175a57532e5b76aa&originationContext=Search%20Result&transitionType=SearchItem&contextData=%28sc.Search%29 The Delaware Court held in the case H.D.E. v. K.L.B, 2013 WL 7020499, that a father showering nude with his daughter was grounds for loss of physical placement even when the mother’s current husband has an extensive criminal record and a history of physical abuse toward the mother which was witnessed by the child. The court orders that the current husband must not be allowed any contact with the child. The family court awarded the mother primary placement of the three children. After an incident witnessed by her children in which her current husband physically assaulted her, the mother turned over placement of the children to the father. The current husband also had an extensive criminal record. The Division of Family Services (DFS) reported that the father was co-sleeping on the couch and showering nude with his daughter, A.S. They informed him that he needed to obtain a separate bed for her and discontinue showering with her. He complied with their directive to obtain a bed for her but continued to shower with her. He claimed that the child had been born with a birth defect and required his assistance in the shower to wash her hair and body. A.S. testified that she was capable of washing herself but admitted that she had not told her father this. When discussing showering with her father, A.S. hung her head and covered her face. She appeared embarrassed, ashamed, and distressed over the occurrences. The court included several provisions in their placement order. First, the mother is to be given primary placement of the child but is not to leave the jurisdiction. She must remain where the child is currently flourishing in both school and church, where she can be close to family, and where DFS can maintain supervision. Second, visitation with the father will be terminated at this time so that the child is not emotionally damaged further. Third, the father will have supervised visits with A.S. on Father’s Day and in December beginning in 2014. Fourth, the father will seek professional counseling. Fifth, the mother’s current husband will not have contact with the child. The sixth provision is jurisdictional. Finally, a copy of the court proceedings will be provided to the counselors for the father and the daughter. Although the mother’s current husband had an extensive criminal history and had assaulted her in front of the children, the court found that she would be a better caretaker to the couple’s young daughter because the father had been co-sleeping on the couch and showering nude with his daughter. DFS had even witnessed the new husband in the home while the mother had the child and the mother admitted that he had been with her as recently as ten that morning. The mother proclaimed that she would leave her husband for the best interests of her daughter. The most significant concern in this case was the daughter’s reaction to the events and the results of her psychological testing, which showed that she had been exposed to extended abuse. The father’s refusal to cooperate with the directives of the Division of Family Services left him in a position that allowed the courts and the Division to further investigate and uncover the true extent of the damage he was causing his daughter. The mother’s agreement to disallow contact between her daughter and her abusive husband kept her daughter from becoming a ward of the state.

Title: Connecticut appellant court holds that the trial court’s decision on modifying custody orders was in the best interests of the child. (BY: Amanda N.)

Links for the opinion: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11085534845205621185&q=+child+custody&hl=en&as_sdt=4,7&as_ylo=2013 http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP147/147AP129.pdf The Appellate Court of Connecticut held in Baker-Grenier v. Grenier, (AC 34992) (Conn. App. Ct. Jan. 14, 2014) that the trial court had acted well in their discretion in granting the defendant’s motion to modify custody and visitation due to a substantial change in circumstances. The plaintiff, Jodi Baker-Grenier and the defendant, Daniel Grenier, were intermarried February 23, 2005. They are the parents of one child, Anthony, who was born on June 26, 1998. The parties’ marriage was dissolved on March 31, 2009. It was decided that the parties would share legal and physical custody of Anthony and that the defendant would be required to provide child support. On April 15, 2011, the defendant filed the previously mentioned motion to modify custody with the goal of obtaining physical custody of the child with the plaintiff receiving reasonable visitation rights. The defendant also filed for a guardian ad litem for the child. The court appointed a guardian ad litem, who then filed a motion to have the defendant’s motion referred to the Family Relations Office of the Court Support Services Division of the Judicial Branch for an evaluation. The defendant also filed a motion to modify, seeking sole legal custody of the child, which was denied. In the evaluation, the family relations officer recommended that the parties continue to share joint legal custody with the defendant having primary physical custody and the final decision-making authority. The guardian ad litem testified that the plaintiff “harbors too much anger…which affects her dealings with...” the defendant. Based on the evidence at the hearing on the motion and the demeanor and credibility of the parties, the court found it to be in the best interests of the child to reside with the defendant. The court ordered that the parties share joint legal custody of the child with the defendant to have final decision-making authority. The court also issued orders regarding a parenting plan, decision-making responsibilities, miscellaneous parenting plan provisions, child support, the guardian ad litem’s fees and costs, as well as further instructions. The plaintiff appealed afterward. The plaintiff claimed that the court had abused its discretion by finding that there had been a substantial change in circumstances to warrant modification of the existing custody and visitation orders. Her second argument was that the court had abused its discretion by finding that the modification of the custody and visitation orders was in the best interests of the child. The Connecticut Appellant Court found that the trial court had acted well within their discretion when it granted the defendant’s motion to modify custody. They supported their decision with “The trial court has the opportunity to view the parties first hand and is therefore in the best position to assess the circumstances surrounding a dissolution action, in which such personal factors such as the demeanor and attitude of the parties are so significant…” Ford v. Ford, 68 Conn. App. 173, 187–88, 789 A.2d 1104, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 910, 796 A.2d 556 (2002). The Connecticut Appellant Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

Title: Kansas: Appeals Court Holds that Grandmother not entitled to the adoption of H.C. and L.C. and mother granted custody. (BY: Lorna M.)

Link for opinion: https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/I5cc3fdd466ce11e196ddf76f9be2cc49/View/FullText.html?listSource=Foldering&originationContext=clientid&transitionType=MyResearchHistoryItem&contextData=%28oc.Search%29&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0 The Kansas Court of Appeals held in Guardianship of H.C. and L.B. by the mother and adoption petition by the grandmother of H.C. and L.C. 270 P.3d 1229 (Kans. Ct. App. 2012) that the mother was granted custody and grandmother was denied being able to adopt the grandchild she was been raising for eight yours. The maternal grandmother had custody of H.C. born December 1999 and L.C. born June 2001 filed for a petition to adopt the children when their mother filed to get the custody of her children back. The mother of H.C. and L.C. had signed temporary custody over to her mother she signed a consent to appointment the guardian for H.C. and L.B. in 2004 to the children’s grandmother. The order appointing guardians included a finding that the guardianship was established so that the Children could get health insurance through Grandparents. The consent or the order included an admission or a finding that Mother was unfit to parent or that the Children were “in need of care” as that term is used in Kansas law. Mother filed a petition to terminate the guardianship in March 2010. Grandparents filed petitions for the adoption of H.C. and L.B. a week later. H.C. had lived with Mother and Grandparents for the first 6 or 7 weeks after his was birth in December 1999. Mother and H.C. then moved out, but H.C. returned to live at the Grandparents home after a few days and has lived there ever since with the Grandparents. L.B. was born in June 2001 and lived full time with the Mother and L.B.'s natural father until she was 6 months old. L.B. began living full time with the Grandparents and H.C. when she was about 9 months old. H.C. spent 30 nights with Mother in 2002 and 10 nights with Mother in 2003. L.B. spent 22 nights with Mother in 2002 and 4 nights with Mother in 2003. The Children didn't spend any nights with Mother for the first 8 months of 2004. In 2004, Mother moved back to the same town as Grandparents to live in a home remodeled by the Grandparents. On at least one occasion, Mother failed to acknowledge the Children when they called to her as she was going into work near the Grandparents' home. The court found that the Mother's circumstances, conduct, or conditions were unlikely to change to meet the Children's needs in the foreseeable future and that it was in the Children's best interests that Mother's parental rights be terminated. On September 23, 2010, the court announced that it was terminating the Mother's parental rights to H.C. and L.B. effectively immediately. The court found that Mother failed to fulfill the duties of a parent and that she waited 10 years to assume her parental duties on a full-time basis. H.C. and L.C.’s Mother left her job at the school district in May 2010, she didn't work in June and July 2010, and then she started a retail job in August 2010. The Mother had originally planned to student teach in the fall of 2010, but she changed her mind and to take a class in the fall of 2010 and student teach in the spring of 2011. At the time of trial, Mother earned $8.25 per hour working 30 to 40 hours per week. Their Mother held a job since 2005, but she didn’t provide any financial support for the Children. On the appeal they must make three determinations. First, they must determine whether the district court properly denied the Mother's petition to terminate the voluntary guardianship. If not, then the Children should have been returned to their Mother. But the inquiry did not end there because the district court had a joint trial on the Grandparents' adoption petitions, which asserted that the Mother's parental rights should be terminated for failure to assume parental duties and because she was an unfit parent. There was no evidence that the Mother was unable to meet the Children's H.C. and L.C. essential needs. The Mother and new Husband were renting a house in which the Children would each had their own bedrooms, their own beds, their own clothing, their own computer, their own television, and their own shared bathroom. The guardian ad litem that was called in recommended that she founds no cause for concern regarding the home. Both of the children H.C. and L.C. have their own rooms and all their needs are provided for. The guardian ad litem also said that Mother's therapist indicated that she had no concerns about allowing the children to live with their mother. The basis for the district court's ruling was that the Children's best interests would be served by terminating the Mother's parental rights and approving the adoption by the Grandparents. But best interests alone cannot be used to terminate parental rights and transfer custody of children to a nonparent. Because there was no other basis for terminating the Mother's parental rights is supported by clear and convincing evidence, best interests cannot by itself justify the district court's decision. After considering all the parties' arguments, the best interests of the Children were found to be with their mother and therefor the petition for the adoption was denied. The children were able to return back one with their mother after eight years.

Colorado: Appeals Court Holds Great-grandmother not Entitled to “Grandparent” Visitation (BY: Melissa W.)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10107526206151929412&q=child+custody&hl=en&as_sdt=4,6&as_ylo=2013 After the district court granted the great-grandmother “grandparent” visitation in the case In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.D.E., 297 P.3d 1059 (Colo. 2013) the appeals court vacated their ruling. In May of 2009 the child’s mother filed a petition for allocation of parental rights to the child. After several months the court entered permanent order and parenting plan between the mother and father. Six months later the great-grandmother filed a motion to intervene in the proceeding along with a motion for “grandparent” visitation. The great-grandmother sought these motions asserting that because grandparents can seek visitation under statute by “logical extension” the great-grandparents should also be able to seek visitation. The father opposed the intervention arguing that because she is the great-grandmother and not the “grandparent” she lacks standing to proceed. The court granted to great-grandmother’s motion to intervene, while reserving ruling on the motion for visitation. The father appealed the order and the district court upheld the magistrate’s ruling. The father then appealed the district court’s order. On appeal the court looked at whether the great-grandparent was a “grandparent” within the meaning of section 19-1-117. Under section 19-17-17 a grandparent is defined as “a person who is the parent of a child’s father or mother.” When examining this definition the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that a great-grandmother is not a grandparent within the meaning of section 19-1-17, and therefore does not have standing to seek visitation rights. Because the great-grandparent does not have standing to seek visitation under the statute the court of appeals reversed the district court’s order.

Title: California Juvenile Court Ruling Against Reunification Upheld (BY: Jolene K.)

Link for opinion: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4405367706003050948&q=CA+Baby+Girl+A&hl=en&as_sdt=6,24&as_ylo=2013 In January 2012 Baby A was born; both mother and baby tested positive for methamphetamine and opiates. The baby was placed in neonatal intensive care. Upon questioning the mother admitted to drug use during pregnancy and stated that the social worker should “do what you got to do and just take her. The father of the baby was named but noted to be incarcerated at the time of birth. The mother had no home or provisions for the baby. The baby was taken into protective custody. The Department filed a Section 300 against both parents alleging that the mother had a history of substance abuse and an extensive criminal history. The father also had an extensive criminal history and was currently incarcerated; neither parent was able to provide care and support for the baby. The father had four children from previous relationships and was currently married to “M.G.” since 2002. The father acknowledged that upon his release from custody he would need substance abuse treatment. He wanted his wife to care for the baby while he was incarcerated. In March 2012 the baby was placed in a foster home. It was recommended that the matter be continued until the results of a paternity test were obtained. The matter was continued. In April 2012 the father was declared the biological father by paternity results. He objected to the denial of reunification services because he was set to be released from custody in two months. He sought a continuance but was denied due to his release being outside of the expiration period for reunification services. Weekly visitation was granted and the matter continued. In June 2013 the mother was scheduled to be released from custody and requested to participate in reunification services upon release. The mothers states that extensive drug use and past history of homelessness, depression and suicide attempts led to her ultimate loss of her children; she requested the baby to be placed with extended family. By preponderance of evidence the juvenile court found all of the allegations within the filings against the parents to be true. On November 14, 2012 it was decided that it would not be in the baby’s best interest to return to the mother or father’s care and the parental rights of both parents were terminated with the baby being freed for adoption.

Title: Arkansas: Appeals Court Holds that Change of Visitation Shall Not Occur (BY: Tammi B.)

Link for option: http://opinions.aoc.arkansas.gov/WebLink8/Browse.aspx?startid=39308 The Arkansas Court of Appeals held in Nichols v. Teer, 2014 Ark. App. 132 (2014) that the mother, Tasha Nichols, had not carried her burden of proving that there had been a material change of circumstances enough to allow for a change in her visitation rights. Tasha Nichols and her former husband Troy, filed for divorce in May 2009. The divorce was granted on July 9, 2009 and at the time of the decree Troy was granted permanent custody of their four children. On July 31, 2010 Troy’s parents, Teresa and Roger Teer sought custody of the children under the claim that neither of the parents had a stable home to offer the children. A hearing was held for the Teer’s case on August 5, 2010 at which Tasha agreed that the Teer’s should have custody of the children. The Teer’s case was held on October 21, 2010 after which the court awarded them permanent custody and Tasha was awarded supervised custody and was ordered to pay child support. Tasha’s visitations were allowed to take place either at her mother’s home or at a child visitation and exchange center called Family Matters, to be paid for at Tasha’s expense. Tasha petitioned to the court on February 16, 2012 for a change in custody stating that she had undergone material changes of circumstances such as acquiring and maintaining a job for the past six months, as well as a steady home for the past six months. The law is clear that [t]he party seeking modification of the custody order has the burden of showing a material change in circumstances. Alphin v. Alphin, 364 Ark. 332, 219 S.W.3d 160 (2005). In order to change custody, the trial court must first determine that a material change in circumstances has occurred since the last order of custody; if that threshold requirement is met, it must then determine who should have custody with the sole consideration being the best interest of the children. Tipton v. Aaron, 87 Ark.App. 1, 185 S.W.3d 142 (2004). The Court found that Nichol’s failed in her burden to prove material changes in circumastance and the children were left in the custody of their grandparents, the Teers. During the trial Nichol’s stated that her visitation with the children had been disrupted and denied by the Teer’s. The Teer’s denied this claiming that Nichol’s had failed in filling out the application for the intended visitation place, Family Matters, as well as failed to schedule the visits. The trial court found that the testimony of the Teers was credible; accordingly, it weighed the evidence in their favor. We defer to the trial court's superior position to view and judge the credibility of the witnesses. Preston, 2014 Ark.App. 58, at 2. Arkansas law is well settled that the primary consideration in child-custody cases is the welfare and best interest of the children; all other considerations are secondary. Anderson v. Thomas, 2013 Ark.App. 653, at 2. The best interest of the children was deemed to be remaining with the Teer’s. In reviewing child-custody cases, we consider the evidence de novo but will not reverse a trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Preston v. Preston, 2014 Ark.App. 58, at 2. Since the initial trial did not have any errors in their original findings for the custody of the children the Court affirmed the decision to deny a change of custody.

Title: Court of Appeals of Arizona Division 1, Department C. Calvin B., Appellant v. Brittany (BY: Caitlin B.)

Title: Court of Appeals of Arizona Division 1, Department C. Calvin B., Appellant v. Brittany B., G.B, Appellees. The Arizona Court of Appeals held in Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) that the mother of the child could not terminate the father’s parental rights based on the claims of abandonment. The mother of the child petitioned to terminate divorced father’s paternal rights based on abandonment because the father had not paid hardly any child support over the past five years and had had little to no contact with the child. The father admitted that he had paid very little child support in the past, but he had made numerous requests to see the child and the mother denied him visitation. In their divorce decree they agreed to twice monthly supervised visits of the child. In 2009 Brittany filed for an order of protection for her and the couple’s son against Calvin. She claimed that Calvin had been using dangerous drugs and was abusive towards her while she was pregnant. Calvin was to have no contact with Brittany. Calvin was to set up visitation with Brittany’s parents from that point on. In approximately November 2010 Brittany ended the visits with Calvin and their son. Calvin had tried to contact Brittany’s parents and they ignored his requests and eventually blocked his phone calls. He attempted to call and text Brittany even though there was a protective order in place. Each time she called the cops on Calvin and he was arrested. His text messages said, “I know I’m not supposed to contact you, please don’t call the cops. Can we please set up a time so I can see him? I really miss him.” The court held that Calvin had failed to complete the parenting class that was required to have the supervised visits, and that he also had paid little to no child support for the child. Calvin had also not established a strong relationship with the child in the last five years. The court of Appeals found that the father had not established much of a relationship with the child, but the claim of ‘abandonment’ cannot be put into place if the custodial parent restricts the other parent from accessing the child. Since Calvin had contacted Brittany and her parents on multiple occasions asking to see the child he was attempting to establish some sort of relationship.